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Abstract
This paper analyses how contractual arrangements for the sale and resale of pre-
mium programming aﬀect competition in the pay-TV market. Competition is less
eﬀective when resale contracts specify per-subscriber fees rather than lump-sum pay-
ments. When premium programming is sold at terms similar to those observed in
the UK, consumers can be made worse oﬀ than in the absence of premium pro-
gramming. A number of potential remedies are considered. A ban on exclusive
vertical contracts would intensify downstream competition and transfer the beneﬁts
of premium programming to consumers.
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11. Introduction
This paper is inspired by recent developments in the UK market for pay television. The
Oﬃce of Fair Trading (OFT) is currently conducting a Competition Act inquiry into the
wholesale pricing and other practices of British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) to determine
whether the company’s position is having a damaging eﬀect on competition in the UK
pay-TV market. This calls for an economic analysis of the contractual arrangements
used to sell and resell broadcasting rights to determine whether they are anticompetitive.
We use a simple model to investigate how diﬀerent types of contracts aﬀect downstream
competition, the distribution of rents between upstream rights owners and downstream
pay-TV companies, and overall economic welfare.
Pay-TV companies in Britain compete by purchasing the rights to broadcast pro-
grammes and then selling subscriptions to viewers.1 There are currently three types of
network: the direct to home (DTH) satellite network operated by BSkyB with approx-
imately 53% of subscribers, local cable networks operated mostly by NTL and Telewest
with 37% of subscribers, and a digital terrestrial network (DTT) operated by the most
recent entrant ONdigital with the remaining 10% of the market.
The companies’ products are diﬀerentiated both in the means of delivery and in the
content of the programming packages oﬀered. The three delivery systems cover diﬀer-
ent but partially overlapping segments of the population.2 Each company oﬀers its own
packages of “basic” programming which must be taken by all subscribers, who can then
purchase “premium” programming, typically major sports events and Hollywood movies,
for the payment of additional monthly fees.3
Access to premium programming is widely viewed as being crucial for attracting cus-
tomers.4 As the ﬁrst entrant in the market, BSkyB earlyo na c q u i r e dt h ee x c l u s i v e b r o a d -
casting rights to practically all of the Hollywood studios’ ﬁrst run ﬁlms, and to most of
the major sports events available to pay TV. For example, the UK’s Premier League has
sold the exclusive rights to broadcast live football matches to pay-TV companies in peri-
odic auctions since 1992.5 BSkyB has so far always acquired these rights under exclusive
1See Armstrong (1999) for a more detailed overview of the UK pay-TV industry.
2DTH satellite network coverage is limited by planning and technological restrictions, with roughly
80% of the population being covered. Currently, cable covers roughly 50% of the population, mainly in
urban areas. At the moment, the coverage of DTT is around 70%, with ONdigital using three of the six
existing terrestrial muliplexes. The other three multiplexes are reserved for free-to-air television. DTT’s
coverage can be increased by upping the power (which depends on the multiplex) to around 95%.
3For example, BSkyB oﬀers a choice between three basic packages with increasing number of channels
(value, popular and family) and oﬀers two premium ﬁlm channels (Moviemax and Sky Premiere) and two
premium sport channels (Sky Sport 1 and 2).
4As Armstrong (1999) notes: “premium programming, where BSkyB currently holds an extremely
strong position, is the major driver of subscriptions.” Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1999) and
Harbord, Hernando and von Graevenitz (2000) ﬁnd evidence that the acquisition of premium programming
rights confers monopoly power on broadcasters.
5Payments for the rights to broadcast live soccer games have grown drastically over time. Until 1992
BBC and ITV acted collusively, obtaining the rights for a yearly payment of roughly 3 million pounds.
BSkyB obtained the rights for a yearly payment of roughly 37 million pounds in 1992, 167 million per
year in 1997, and 366.6 million per year in 2000. See Cave and Crandall (2001) for a recent account of
1vertical contracts and has been selling the resulting premium programming directly to
its subscribers. BSkyB has also been selling premium programmes indirectly to the sub-
scribers of the competing pay-TV companies in exchange for payments of per-subscriber
monthly fees. The implications of these contractual reselling arrangements for downstream
competition and economic welfare are not yet well understood.
When supplying under complete information to a monopolist who sells in an inde-
pendent market, it is better to use ﬁxed rather than variable fees in order to avoid the
reduction in proﬁts associated with double marginalisation (Spengler (1950)). The obser-
vation of reselling at variable fees in the UK pay-TV market is then indirect evidence of
interdependence between the markets of the diﬀerent pay-TV providers. In our model the
demand for the programming of diﬀerent pay-TV providers are interdependent.
Our point of departure is Armstrong’s (1999) recent analysis of these issues in the
context of Hotelling’s model with asymmetries in the products’ values and costs.6 Although
this simple model is special and abstracts from a number of potentially relevant features
of the industry, it is quite well suited to illustrate the eﬀects of horizontal and vertical
contracts and to address possible remedies. We adopt his same model and discuss the
robustness of our ﬁndings throughout the paper.
Firms initially compete in prices to sell diﬀerentiated products (basic programming)
to customers. One ﬁrm (the industry leader) is assumed to be more eﬃcient than its rival
or equivalently to have previously acquired a more attractive package of basic program-
ming. Acquisition of premium programming symmetrically increases the attractiveness of
each ﬁrm’s programming to subscribers. The outcome of the sale of the premium pro-
gramming rights in the upstream market has an impact on the competitive balance in the
downstream pay-TV market. A downstream ﬁrm which acquires the exclusive rights to
premium programming obtains a competitive advantage over its rival ﬁrm which suﬀers a
loss (a negative externality). Competition to purchase the rights can therefore be mod-
elled as an auction with externalities in which downstream competition is aﬀected by the
outcome of the auction, as in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000). In the absence of resale, the
industry leader will outbid the rival in the auction.
Armstrong (1999) considers the case of the industry leader reselling the programming
to its downstream competitor for a lump-sum (i.e. ﬁxed) payment. As a result, the compet-
itive advantage of the industry leader is reduced and the additional surplus from premium
programming is captured by the consumers. Although the smaller downstream ﬁrm bene-
ﬁts from having access to the premium product, this gain is less than the industry leader’s
loss in competitive advantage from reselling. Reselling always increases consumer surplus
and typically increases social welfare, but is not privately proﬁtable for ﬁxed fees.7
the role of sport rights in the broadcast industry.
6Extensions of Hotelling’s model have been widely used in a variety of similar contexts. See e.g. Laﬀont,
Rey and Tirole’s (1998) analysis of reciprocal network access pricing.
7Armstrong also considers alternative mechanisms (i.e. diﬀerent vertical contracts) the upstream rights
seller might adopt for selling premium programming rights, and concludes that the seller will prefer
exclusive contracting when programming is sold for either lump sum or per subscriber fees. Essentially,
exclusive contracting allows the upstream rights seller to exploit the negative externality suﬀered by a
downstream ﬁrm which fails to acquire the rights, and hence increases its payoﬀ. See also Armstrong
2Very diﬀerent conclusions obtain when downstream ﬁrms are allowed to resell premium
programming through their competitors for per-subscriber (i.e. variable) fees. By reselling
premium programming for per-subscriber fees, the downstream ﬁrm which acquires the ex-
clusive rights raises the rival’s marginal cost and simultaneously increases the opportunity
cost of serving its own customers.8,9 Downstream competition is less eﬀective and equilib-
rium retail prices are higher when resale contracts specify a per-subscriber fee rather than
a lump-sum payment. The model predicts that reselling takes place and that the upstream
rights’ seller prefers exclusive to nonexclusive vertical contracts, as observed.
With reselling for per-subscriber fees, premium programming becomes available to
all consumers and this in itself increases social welfare. The per-subscriber resale price
acts as an eﬀective mechanism for relaxing downstream price competition and extracting
consumer surplus from the premium product. It is as if the premium programming market
were monopolized by a single ﬁrm. As a result of these vertical and horizontal contracts
some consumers are worse oﬀ t h a ni nt h ec a s eo fn or e s a l e ,w h e ns o m eo ft h e ma r ed e p r i v e d
of premium programming. In aggregate, consumers would prefer a ban on resale contracts,
even though this would typically reduce social welfare.
Premium programming is the essential facility of a vertically integrated supplier to
which downstream competitors would like to gain access. Departing from most of the
access pricing literature, in our setting the vertically integrated ﬁrm sets its own down-
stream price with no intervention by the regulator. Our analysis in Section 3.3.2 explicitly
accounts for the strategic eﬀect resulting from the dependence of the access price on the
downstream price. According to the so-called “DTH linkage” scheme, the variable resale
price for premium programming is set in advance by BSkyB as a ﬁxed percentage of its
own corresponding retail price. We show that this pricing scheme is likely to induce even
higher retail prices, so that consumer surplus can actually be lower than in the absence of
premium programming.
Finally, we discuss a number of possible competition policy measures, some of which
have already been implemented by the UK authorities. In our simple model neither a
price-squeeze test nor forced rights splitting (equivalent to forced rights divestiture) have
any eﬀect on pricing, proﬁts or consumer welfare. A ban on exclusive vertical contracts,
however, would intensify downstream competition and transfer the social beneﬁts of pre-
mium programming from ﬁrms to consumers.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model; Section 3 analyses
the strategic eﬀect of resale contracts on downstream competition; Section 4 compares dif-
ferent selling strategies of the upstream rights’ seller; Section 5 discusses various remedies;
Section 6 discusses the connection with the licensing literature; and Section 7 concludes.
(2000) for a simple example of this eﬀect.
8Salop and Scheﬀman (1983), (1987) and Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) are standard references on
raising rivals’ cost via the sale of an essential input.
9In the competitive regime of the Hotelling model, an increase in the per subscriber resale fee shifts the
reaction functions of both ﬁrms outwards by the same amount, inducing both ﬁrms to increase their retail
prices. As discussed in the paper, the opportunity cost eﬀect of resale on the selling ﬁrm’s competitive
incentives is present more generally in models of price competition.
32. Model
Timing. We consider a three stage game. First, the upstream monopolist sells the
premium rights to one or both of the downstream ﬁrms. Second, if a downstream ﬁrm
acquired the premium rights it resells them to the competing ﬁrm according to some
contractual terms. Third, downstream ﬁrms compete to attract ﬁnal customers.
Downstream competition. Two downstream television broadcasters (or ﬁrms) A and
B compete to sell horizontally diﬀerentiated “basic” programming to consumers. Firm i’s
marginal cost of serving a consumer is ci.T h eﬁrms post prices simultaneously. Product
diﬀerentiation may stem either from the diﬀerence in the basic programming packages
oﬀered by the ﬁrms or in the means of delivery (satellite, cable, digital terrestrial). Some
buyers prefer the programming of one ﬁrm to that of the other. Consumers are indexed
by their location on the unit interval x ∈ [0,1] and distributed uniformly. The two ﬁrms
are located at the end points of the interval, ﬁrm A at 0 and ﬁrm B at 1,s ot h a tc o n s u m e r
x receives utility uA − tx − pA from purchasing ﬁrm A’ sp r o d u c ta tp r i c epA and utility
uB − t(1 − x) − pB from purchasing ﬁrm B’s product at price pB.10 Let si ≡ ui − ci ≥ 0
denote the utility of the consumer with highest valuation for good i net of the production
cost of that good. We allow for asymmetries between the ﬁrms by assuming without loss
of generality that ﬁrm A has a competitive advantage, sA ≥ sB.11,12
Premium programming. Premium programming is modelled as in Armstrong (1999).
If ﬁrm i acquires the programming and makes it available, the gross utility it oﬀers increases
from ui to ui+α. All consumers are assumed to value the content of premium programming
equally, being prepared to pay up to α > 0 for it.13 Since in this model all consumers
wish to purchase the premium product, the premium and basic products are oﬀered only
as bundles. For simplicity, a ﬁrm’s marginal cost of supplying the premium programming
once they already serve a customer is assumed to be zero.
Equilibrium in the competitive regime. The qualitative features of the equilibrium
in the Hotelling model depend on the parameters t, sA and sB.W ef o c u so nt h e“ c o m p e t -
itive” regime, where both ﬁrms are active and the market is covered, so that the marginal
10Since very few consumers subscribe to more than one pay TV provider, we exclude this possibility in
the model.
11This competitive advantage may derive from a ﬁrst-mover advantage, which has allowed ﬁrm A to
acquire a more attractive package of basic programming rights. Alternatively, ﬁrm A could have a tech-
nological advantage. For example, since a satellite broadcaster is less capacity constrained than a digital
terrestrial provider, it can oﬀer a larger programming package.
12Asymmetries in market shares could also be due to diﬀerent installed bases in the presence of consumer
switching costs. This model can be extended to incorporate these dynamic considerations along the lines
of Beggs and Klemperer (1992).
13A companion paper analyses resale contracts in a richer model which allows for both horizontal and
vertical diﬀerentiation in the tastes of consumers.
4consumer of each ﬁrm derives positive utility (net of the price paid and the transporta-
tion cost incurred), being indiﬀerent between buying from either ﬁrm. The demand for
one ﬁrm then increases in the competitor’s price. The competitive regime results when
there is enough, but not too much, product diﬀerentiation: t ∈ [(sA − sB)/3,(sA + sB)/3].
Equilibrium prices are
pi = t +
1
3
(ui − uj + cj +2 ci). (2.1)


















for i = A,B. Note that a uniform increase in the gross surpluses of both ﬁr m si sc o m p e t e d
away, so that proﬁts depend on gross surpluses only through their diﬀerence si − sj.I n
addition, proﬁts are convex in si − sj because competitive pressure is reduced in more
asymmetric situations.14 An increase in the asymmetry increases proﬁts of the superior
ﬁrm more than it decreases proﬁts of the inferior one. The sum of the ﬁrms’ equilibrium
proﬁts

















so that total welfare is











3. Contracting with Rivals
We now analyse how the equilibrium in the downstream retail market is aﬀected by the
presence of the premium programming and the contractual terms used to sell and resell it.
For simplicity we assume that the ﬁrms remain in the competitive regime when one ﬁrm
acquires the premium programming rights
t ≥
sA + α − sB
3
, (3.1)
14More generally, Bester and Petrakis (1993) note this convexity property in a model of diﬀerentiated
duopoly with linear demand under Bertrand and Cournot competition.
5so that both ﬁrms remain active.15 T h er i g h t so w n e rc a nc h o o s et os e l lt h ep r e m i u m
programming rights either exclusively to one downstream ﬁrm or nonexclusively to both
broadcasters. It can also choose between selling for a lump-sum fee, on a per-subscriber
basis, or using a two-part tariﬀ. The downstream ﬁrm which acquires the exclusive rights
can also choose to resell the programming to its rival for a lump-sum fee, a per-subscriber
fee, or under a two-part tariﬀ. For now we assume that the upstream rights owner sells
the rights exclusively for a lump-sum payment and focus here on the downstream ﬁrms’
resale decisions. More general upstream contracts are considered in Section 4.
3.1. No reselling
How much are the downstream ﬁrms are willing to pay for the exclusive broadcasting rights
to α in the absence of reselling? If ﬁrm i acquires the rights, its downstream proﬁts increase
by bi = πi (si + α,s j)−πi (si,s j) > 0.I fi n s t e a dﬁrm i fails to acquire the exclusive rights
when ﬁrm j succeeds, its downstream proﬁts decrease by li = πi (si,s j)−πi (si,s j + α) > 0,
where li is the negative externality imposed on ﬁrm i from the acquisition of exclusive rights
by its competitor in the absence of reselling.
A ﬁrm’s total willingness to pay for the exclusive rights which cannot be resold is
Γi = bi + li.N o t e t h a t ΓA ≥ ΓB if and only if Π(sA + α,s B) > Π(sA,s B + α).S i n c e
Π(sA,s B) is increasing in the absolute value of the diﬀerence in gross surpluses |sA − sB|
and sA ≥ sB, A’s willingness to pay for the rights exceeds B’s. Firm A has an advantage
in acquiring the rights under any selling procedure.
The revenue RS obtained by the upstream rights’ seller from the rights depends on the
bargaining power vis à vis the downstream ﬁrms.16 If the upstream rights’ seller holds
an ascending-bid (second price) auction with no reserve price, ﬁrm A wins the auction
for a price of ΓB.U s i n gt h es y m b o lδ to denote the change in a variable with respect to
the equilibrium in the absence of the premium programming, we have δπA = bA − ΓB,
δπB = −lB and RS = bB + lB. Alternatively, if the upstream rights’ seller has all the
bargaining power, it could make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the downstream broadcasters.
This is equivalent to the rights’ seller holding an ascending-bid auction with an optimal
reserve price of ΓA,s ot h a tﬁrm A acquires the rights for a price of ΓA.I nt h i sc a s e ,w e
have δπi = −li and RS = bA + lA. Both downstream broadcasters are made worse oﬀ by












15This assumption is made to simplify the exposition. When it is violated, acquisition of the rights can
lead to one ﬁrm becoming a monopolist (in the “limit pricing” regime). It is easy to show that, also in
such a case, reselling of premium programming for ﬁxed fees never occurs and reselling for per-subscriber
fees always occurs.
16When the rights are sold nonexclusively the upstream seller cannot implement a standard auction
procedure. In this case we assume that the seller can either make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, or that the








When only ﬁrm A has access to the premium programming, the beneﬁts are shared between
ﬁrm A and its customers who receive a utility increment of α while A’s price increases
by α/3. In addition, ﬁrm B’s customers beneﬁt from the reduction in ﬁrm B’s price
induced by ﬁrm A’s acquisition of the exclusive rights. Hence, aggregate consumer surplus
increases as do downstream proﬁts (gross of RS) and total welfare. The total welfare gain
may exceed α if the initial asymmetry sA−sB is large enough (see Armstrong (1999) page
276).
3.2. Reselling for lump-sum payment
As remarked above, when contracting with an independent monopolist it is best to sell
premium programming for a lump-sum payment. It is then natural to consider what
happens when downstream broadcasters with interdependent demands are able to resell
the premium programming to their competitors for a lump-sum payment. If the rights are
resold in this way, downstream proﬁts are the same as they would be in the absence of
the premium programming, πi (si + α,s j + α)=πi (si,s j). The additional value available
from the provision of premium programming cannot be appropriated by the competitors.
From equations (2.1) it is easy to check that equilibrium prices are unchanged, even though
all consumers now receive the utility increment α. Total downstream proﬁts are unchanged,
while both consumer surplus and total welfare increase by the beneﬁts α from premium
programming.
Completing Armstrong’s (1999) analysis, we show that reselling of premium program-
ming for lump-sum fees only takes place when it results in an increase in asymmetry:17
Proposition 1 Reselling for lump-sum payment is never proﬁtable for ﬁrm A,a n di ti s
proﬁtable for ﬁrm B whenever α ≤ 2(sA−sB).T h eﬁrms’ willingness to pay for the rights
are ΓA = bA + lA and ΓB =m a xhlA,b Bi + lB.
Firm A is willing to pay more than B since lA ≥ lB and bA > maxhlA,b Bi.W h e n
the upstream rights’ seller has all the bargaining power, ﬁrm A will win the auction for a
payment of ΓA. Hence δπA = −lA, δπB = −lB and RS = bA+lA. If the rights’ seller holds
an ascending bid auction for the rights with no reserve price, A will win the auction for a
payment of ΓB,s oδπA = bA − ΓB, δπB = −lB,a n dRS = lA + lB.D o w n s t r e a m p r o ﬁts,
consumer surplus and total welfare are all the same as they would be under no reselling.
However, since ΓB = lB +m a xhlA,b Bi in this case, A pays weakly more for the rights
in an ascending bid auction with no reserve price than in the case of no reselling. The
17We assume the reselling ﬁrm retains the right to broadcast premium programming to its subscribers.
If instead ﬁrm B could resell to ﬁrm A by granting A the exclusive rights to the premium programming
(so that ﬁrm B no longer retains the rights for itself), then B could obtain bA + lA from A for the rights
by making a take-or-leave-it oﬀer. Clearly B would then always choose to resell, since bA +lA >b B +lB,
and the value of the rights would be the same to both downstream ﬁrms. This form of resale is typically
not allowed under rights contracts in the UK pay-TV market.
7eﬀect of allowing reselling for lump-sum payment is to increase weakly the revenues to the
upstream rights’ seller, with no change to the allocation. But the restriction to lump-sum
payment is not innocuous.
3.3. Reselling for per-subscriber fee
In reality, BSkyB has been acquiring premium rights and then reselling them to the com-
petitors for per-subscriber fees. The analysis in this section rationalises this. Reselling
for a per-subscriber fee of q increases the marginal cost of the ﬁrm purchasing the pro-
gramming by q, while at the same time increasing the marginal opportunity cost of the
reselling ﬁrm. The reselling ﬁrm, however, receives additional revenue of qxj where xj is
the market share of the purchasing ﬁrm. This makes reselling more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm
which acquires the rights, and hence more likely to occur. When ﬁrm i acquires the rights
and resells for a per-subscriber fee of q to ﬁrm j, i’s proﬁts are
πi =( pi − ci)xi + qxj =( pi − ci − q)xi + qX (3.2)
where the total demand served is denoted by X = xi + xj,a n dj’s proﬁts are
πj =( pj − cj − q)xj. (3.3)
When the market is covered, as in the competitive regime, total demand is ﬁxed at X =1 .
Firms therefore compete as if both their marginal costs had increased by q, while the ﬁrm
reselling the rights receives additional revenues equal to q.
When the per-subscriber charge q exceeds α, the buying ﬁrm has a proﬁtable deviation:
Lemma 1 The per-subscriber resale charge cannot be larger than the value of the pre-
mium programming to consumers, i.e. q ≤ α.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that for q ≤ α we are guaranteed to remain in the competitive regime where (2.3)
holds, so that proﬁts are πi = πi (si,s j)+q and πj = πj (sj,s i).F i r mj’s equilibrium proﬁts
are invariant with respect to q while ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are strictly increasing in q.W h e nﬁrm
i resells to j it will then want to set the value of q as high as possible. Since ﬁrm j is
indiﬀerent over all values of q, higher values of q correspond to Pareto improvements in
welfare of the two ﬁrms. One implication of this is that determination of the value of q
does not depend upon the relative bargaining positions of ﬁrms i and j.T h e ﬁrms will
then agree to set q = α, the highest value consistent with equilibrium.18
Firm i will therefore be willing to resell the rights for a variable charge of q if and
only if q ≥ bi where bi < α by assumption (3.1) guaranteeing that we remain in the
competitive regime once ﬁrm i acquires the premium programming rights. Once either
ﬁrm A or ﬁrm B acquires the rights, it resells them to its rival for a per-subscriber fee
18The analysis can be easily extended diﬀerentiated Bertrand competition with linear demand system.
In this case the buying ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is decreasing in q.
8q = α.T h i sl e a v e st h er i v a lﬁrm in precisely the same position it would have been if the
premium programming rights were not available. The proﬁts of the ﬁrm which acquires
the exclusive rights from the upstream rights’ seller are also the same as they would have
been if the premium programming rights had not been made available, except that it now
receives the per-subscriber charge α.W ec o n c l u d e :
Proposition 2 The ﬁrm i which acquires the exclusive rights to the premium program-
ming always resells to the competitor j at a variable fee q∗ = α.T h e p a y o ﬀsa r e
πi (si,s j)+α and πj (sj,s i).
When rights are resold for a per-subscriber fee of α, each ﬁrm’s willingness to pay for
t h er i g h t si st h e nΓi = πi (si,s j)+α − πi (si,s j)=α = Γj. Resale for per-subscriber fees
equalizes the value of the rights to each ﬁrm. The upstream rights’ seller will now obtain
RS = α for the rights under either a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer or in a second price auction
with no reserve price. Hence, although consumers in aggregate receive an additional gross
utility of α, all of this surplus is captured by the ﬁrm which acquires the rights via the
per-subscriber charge q = α, which is then passed on to the upstream rights’ seller. Since
both ﬁrms’ equilibrium prices increase by exactly α, aggregate consumer surplus is the






Resale for a per-subscriber fee of α means that consumers receive no beneﬁtf r o mt h e
availability of the premium programming, and the upstream rights’ seller captures the
entire social surplus created by its product.
Resale of premium programming for per-subscriber fees thus unequivocally reduces
consumer welfare compared to the case of no resale. It does, however, have an ambiguous
eﬀect on total welfare due to the diﬀerent allocations of the premium and basic program-
ming in the two cases. When programming rights are resold for a per-subscriber fee, all
consumers in the market will eﬃciently purchase the premium product. In the absence
of resale, on the other hand, some consumers are excluded from consuming the premium
product, but a larger fraction of consumers will purchase from ﬁrm A. Because the ex
ante market share of ﬁrm A is ineﬃciently low (due to the usual monopoly distortion), the
latter eﬀect tends to increase total welfare. Resale will then be welfare improving if the net
utilities from the two basic products are not too asymmetric. More precisely, a necessary
condition for reselling to reduce total welfare it is that the ex ante market share of ﬁrm A
be at least 60%; if α is small then ﬁrm A’ sm a r k e ts h a r em u s tb ea tl e a s t8 0 % .W h e nt h i s
occurs, resale for a per-subscriber fee will be privately proﬁtable, but not socially optimal.
93.3.1. The strategy of reselling.
Reselling for per-subscriber fees allows the downstream ﬁrm to prevent the dissipation of
downstream premium programming proﬁts by raising its rival’s costs, while simultaneously
increasing the opportunity cost of serving its own customers. The opportunity cost eﬀect
reﬂects the fact that when the market is covered any revenues earned by the reselling
ﬁrm from reducing its price and serving additional customers are at the expense of resale
revenue that would otherwise have been received from the rival. This reduction in resale
revenue has exactly the same eﬀect as an increase in the reselling ﬁrm’s marginal costs,
giving both ﬁrms an incentive to increase their retail prices in equilibrium.
When ﬁrm A acquires the rights and resells to ﬁrm B at a resale price of q,t h eﬁrms’
proﬁts may be written as
πA =( pA − c
0
A)xA + qX
πB =( pB − c
0
B)xB
where the new cost is c0
i = ci +q. The reselling ﬁrm A chooses strategically the variable q
taking into account the impact on the outcome of competition. Following the analysis of
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the eﬀect of
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strategic raising rival’s cost eﬀect














strategic opportunity cost eﬀect
(3.4)
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10The ﬁrst addend is the strategic raising rivals’ cost eﬀect on A’s proﬁts through a
change in B’s price, brought about by a change in B’s costs. The second addend is
the strategic opportunity cost eﬀect on A’s proﬁts through a change in B’s price, brought
about by a change in A’s opportunity costs. The third addend is the direct opportunity
cost eﬀect. The fourth addend is the resale revenue eﬀect, reﬂecting the increase in the
reselling ﬁrm’s revenues from sales of the premium product to its own customers, and to
those of its rival.
Equation (3.4) is generally valid for Bertrand price competition. In the competitive






















T h es u mo ft h et w os t r a t e g i ce ﬀects exactly oﬀsets the opportunity cost eﬀect, so that
the total eﬀect of a marginal increase in the per-subscriber fee is an increase in the selling




Similar analysis shows that the buyer’s proﬁts are unaﬀected:
dπB
dq =0 .I tc a nb es h o w n
that the strategic eﬀects are weaker under Bertrand price competition with diﬀerentiated
products than in the Hotelling model, so that the total eﬀect on the seller’s proﬁts is then
dπA
dq ≤ X a n do nt h eb u y e r
dπB
dq ≤ 0.
In the Cournot model the reselling ﬁrm’s proﬁts are πA =( pA(xA,x B) − c0
A)xA + qX
for a given resale price q, where again X = xA + xB and c0
i = ci + q. After application of

















The ﬁrst addend is the strategic raising rivals’ cost eﬀect on A’s proﬁts from a decrease
in B’s output due to an increase in B’s costs; the last addend is the resale revenue eﬀect.
Note that there is no strategic opportunity cost eﬀect nor a direct opportunity cost eﬀect.
The resale price q appears as an addition to marginal cost for ﬁrm B only in the Cournot
model, and does not aﬀect the reaction function of ﬁrm A.
The Hotelling and Cournot models are both special cases in which the reselling ﬁrm’s
opportunity costs from serving an additional customer (unit of demand) are equal to q
and zero respectively. In models of Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated products this
opportunity cost always exceeds zero, but is less than q.T h e e ﬀect of setting q = α on
equilibrium prices and proﬁts is thus greatest in the Hotelling model (where equilibrium
prices increase by α compared to no reselling) and smallest in the Cournot model (where
the equilibrium price is unchanged).
113.3.2. Proportional resale pricing: DTH linkage
The terms on which BSkyB resells programming to its competitors is subject to informal
regulatory oversight by the Oﬃce of Fair Trading, under what is known as the “rate card.”
According to the so-called DTH linkage scheme, the rate card makes BSkyB’s wholesale
prices equal to a percentage of its retail prices to consumers. Currently, BSkyB charges
its downstream competitors 57% or 59% of the retail price for direct subscription to the
premium channel involved. For example, the wholesale price per-subscriber for a single
premium channel is 57% of BSkyB’s retail price for the BSkyB package which includes its
largest basic package and that premium channel.19
The problem of access pricing when the ﬁrm giving access is a price setter has been
considered by Laﬀont and Tirole (1994, Section 7) and Armstrong and Vickers (1998).
Realising that the downstream price is an increasing function of the access price, the
regulator lowers the access price relative to the full regulation case (which results in same
cases in the Baumol-Willig eﬃcient component pricing rule). However, these papers do
not consider the strategic eﬀect resulting from the fact that the access price is often set
to depend on the downstream price, as in the case of the eﬃcient component pricing rule
and DTH linkage. This strategic eﬀect is the focus of our analysis in this section and is
more generally present in other situations where the access price depends on unregulated
retail prices.
The Oﬃce of Fair Trading (1996) reviewed the linkage between the wholesale price at
which BSkyB sold to cable companies and its DTH retail price. As reported at page 15,
DTH linkage was found not to be per se anticompetitive: “We conceded that tying the
wholesale price to the retail price, might have the eﬀect of limiting potential price com-
petition between DTH and cable. However, this eﬀect could be obtained without linkage.
Were BSkyB to abandon the DTH linkage and set its wholesale price independently the
same eﬀect could be achieved. It could set both the wholesale and retail prices at the
levels it believed the market would bear. The two prices would thus be related. If BSkyB
were to raise its retail price, there would be some substitution from DTH to cable. The
return to BSkyB from its wholesale price would be lower than from DTH, so BSkyB would
have an incentive to raise wholesale prices for cable. The eﬀects would be similar to the
direct linkage. No clear evidence of adverse eﬀects arising solely from DTH linkage had
been produced and we concluded that no action was necessary in respect of this issue.”
We challenge the view that DTH linkage does not aﬀect downstream competition.
Consider the Hotelling model where ﬁrm i resells premium programming to the competitor
j at a variable fee equal to a ﬁxed proportion 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 of its own downstream price,
i.e. q = µpi. With proportional resale price, a small reduction in the reselling ﬁrm’s retail
19Various discounts on these wholesale prices are oﬀered and these determine whether the 59% or the
57% ﬁgure apply. Even if the cost of the largest basic (“family”) package is imputed in the base for
computing the wholesale price for the premium channels, none of the basic channels become available to
t h es u b s c r i b e r . S e ef o o t n o t e3o nt h ed i ﬀerent packages and premium channels oﬀered. An important
feature of DTH linkage scheme is that the resale price for a premium channel depends on BSkyB’s retail
total price for the basic package plus premium, rather than on the marginal price for premium for a
customer who has already subscribed to BSkyB.
12price results in a reduction not only in the resale revenues from the rival ﬁrm’s marginal
customers, but also in the resale price, and hence in the resale revenue received from all of
its rival’s inframarginal customers. This makes a reduction in price to attract the rival’s
customers even less proﬁtable, and allows the ﬁrms to sustain higher equilibrium prices.
Consider downstream competition among the ﬁrms when ﬁrm i resells to ﬁrm j for a
per-subscriber fee of µpi for given µ. Assuming that ﬁrm j purchases, downstream proﬁts
in the competitive regime are
πi =( pi − ci)xi + µpi(1 − xi) = ((1 − µ)pi − ci)xi + µpi
πj =( pj − cj − µpi)xj.
An increase in µ shifts upward the best replies of both ﬁrms, so higher values of µ result




(3 + µ)t +( si − sj)(1− µ)+( 3− µ)ci





(3 + µ2)t − (1 − µ)2(si − sj)+( 3− µ)(ciµ + cj (1 − µ))
(1 − µ)(3− µ)
.




j ≤ ui + uj − t,
which is always satisﬁed at µ =0and violated at µ =1 . We assume that ui +uj is always
suﬃciently large to guarantee that we remain in the competitive regime for values of µ not
exceeding µ such that µpµ = α.20
Comparison of proportional with variable resale price. We show that any given
level of the resale price q ≤ α can be implemented under the proportional pricing scheme
by choosing the appropriate value of µ, and that this results in both downstream ﬁrms
charging higher prices and earning greater proﬁts than they would if q were set indepen-
dently.
Proposition 3 The reselling ﬁrm A can implement more proﬁtably any value of the vari-
able fee q with a proportional resale price. The resulting equilibrium prices are higher.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Independent resale pricing is dominated by proportional resale pricing. Prices and
proﬁts for both ﬁrms are higher under proportional resale pricing when µpA = q ≤ α.T h e
argument in the proof also shows that these higher retail prices could not be sustained
without linkage. Intuitively, less competitive prices are supported in equilibrium because
by reducing the downstream price the selling ﬁrm also reduces automatically its resale
price to the competitor. Charging the competitor a price proportional to the downstream
price is an eﬀective way for the selling ﬁrm to credibly commit not to undercut its price.
Given strategic complementarity, the prices of both ﬁrms end up being higher than under
unconditional variable fee.
20Gilbert and Matutes (1993) and Laﬀont, Rey and Tirole (1998) make similar assumptions.
13Consumer welfare is thus further reduced by proportional resale pricing. When q =
µpi consumers end up worse oﬀ than they would be if the premium product were not
available. The resale of premium programming becomes a mechanism for altering the
pricing incentives of the competing ﬁrms so as to achieve even more collusive outcomes at
the expense of consumers.
The optimal value of µ. It is natural to ask what is the optimal level µ that the
selling ﬁrm will set. Unfortunately, we are not able to give a deﬁnite answer to this
question. It can be shown that in the competitive regime the selling ﬁrm’s proﬁts (A.1) are
increasing in µ, but this expression is valid only if the buying ﬁrm does not wish to deviate.
Lemma 1 guarantees that for values of µ such that µp
µ
i > α, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium, so the buyer must mix between purchasing and not purchasing the premium
content. Under the assumption that the expected payoﬀ of the seller in the resulting
mixed-strategy equilibrium will not exceed the most proﬁtable pure-strategy equilibrium
payoﬀ for the reselling ﬁrm, the reselling ﬁrm will wish to set µ such that µp
µ
i = α as in the
previous analysis.21 Retail prices increase by more than α compared to the basic product
equilibrium, and hence consumers suﬀer a reduction in consumer surplus. The resale of
premium programming becomes a device for extracting more consumer surplus from sales
of the basic product.
Willingness to pay for ﬁxed µ. Which ﬁrm is willing to pay more for the premium
rights when the wholesale price is proportional to the retail price, with ﬁxed factor µ?T h e


















2 (cA − cB)+2( 1− µ)(sA − sB)
(3 − µ)
2 (1 − µ)
.
Because of the proportional wholesale price, the selling ﬁrm ends up reducing its market
s h a r ea n dt h eb u y i n gﬁrm increasing it. For given µ,j o i n tp r o ﬁts are then higher when
the selling ﬁrm is the inferior ﬁrm B (sB <s A), provided that it also has lower costs
(cB <c A). In this case, ﬁrm B is willing to pay more than A.
A simple remedy. A simple regulatory remedy to the proportional resale problem
identiﬁed in this section would be to forbid the reselling price from being proportional to the
21When instead µ>µ, by Lemma 1, ﬁrm j can proﬁtably deviate to oﬀering the basic product at a
price of p
µ
j − α, so none of ﬁrm j’s subscribers will purchase the premium product, and resale revenues
are reduced to zero. Hence ﬁrm j purchasing at a price µp
µ
i > α cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium.
However both ﬁrms oﬀering prices contingent upon ﬁrm j not purchasing cannot be a pure strategy
equilibrium either, at least for values of µ not too much larger than µ, since in such an equilibrium the
reseller will oﬀer a price strictly less than p
µ
i resulting in µpnoresale
i ≤ α. Given this, the buyer will wish
to purchase, and the seller wish to increase its price to p
µ
i . The only equilibrium for µ ∈ [µ,b µ] is then
a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the buying ﬁrm randomizes over purchasing and not purchasing.
For µ>b µ there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which the buyer does not purchase, where b µ is
deﬁned by b µpnoresale
i = α.
14current price, while still allowing it to depend on the historic price. With this modiﬁcation
the variable fee charged to the competitor is independent of the seller’s downstream price.
From now on, we return to the case where the resale price does not depend on the retail
price.
3.4. More general resale contracts
Reselling for two-part tariﬀs. Consider now reselling of premium programming under
at w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ hqi,Q ii,w h e r eqi is the variable or per-subscriber fee and Qi is the ﬁxed
payment from the buying ﬁrm j to the reselling ﬁrm i. The deviation argument of Lemma
1 continues to remain valid, so that we must still have qi ≤ α. This implies that the
equilibrium market shares and prices of each ﬁrm are unchanged. A two-part tariﬀ of this
form merely redistributes rent between the two ﬁrms, without aﬀecting the outcome in the
downstream market.
When ﬁrm i can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, we have hqi,Q ii = hα,l ji.T h eﬁxed
component of the two-part tariﬀ serves the purpose of extracting the buying ﬁrm’s rent
lj = πj(sj,s i) − πj(sj,s i + α),e q u a lt ot h ed i ﬀerence in the proﬁts achieved by j when i
alone sells the premium product to that achieved when i resells to j.F i r mi’s willingness
to pay for the rights to the premium programming is then Γi = α + lj + li,s ot h a tt h e
value of the rights is again the same to both ﬁrms and the upstream rights’ seller obtains
RS = li + lj + α, under either a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer or in a second price auction with
no reserve price.
It is puzzling that the reselling contract used by BSkyB does not involve a ﬁxed com-
ponent. This could be due to a situation of bilateral monopoly in reselling. If the reselling
ﬁrm does not have all of the bargaining power, all resale contracts of the form hqi,Q ii
resulting from eﬃcient bargaining will still have qi = α, but they might involve Qi < 0.
For example, j’s payoﬀ under Nash bargaining
πj (sj,s i + α)+
1
2
(πi (si,s j)+πj (sj,s i)+α − πi (si + α,s j) − πj (sj,s i + α))
can be written as πj (sj,s i)+α/6, so that to achieve the Nash bargaining payoﬀst h eﬁxed
payment from the buying ﬁrm to the selling ﬁrm is negative, Qi = −α/6 < 0.B u ts u c ha
ﬁxed payment from the seller to the buyer could raise suspicion of collusion. We conclude
that in the presence of bilateral monopoly and a non-negativity constraint on the transfers
from the buyer to the seller, the ﬁxed component of the two part tariﬀ is equal to zero.
Contingent contracts and quantity discounts. The selling ﬁrm could further in-
crease proﬁts by using contingent contracts which specify transfers conditional on prices
or quantities. Clearly, the joint monopoly outcome can be achieved if the competing ﬁrms
sign fully contingent contracts with penalties for deviations by either ﬁrm. However, such
contracts would typically be deemed illegal due to violation of competition laws, and would
therefore be unenforceable.
The resale of premium programming can become a mechanism for altering the pricing
incentives of ﬁrms so as to achieve more collusive outcomes at the expense of consumers.
15The contractual terms for selling the premium programming could be chosen so as to
maximise the seller’s proﬁts. For instance, the selling ﬁrm could easily impose penalties,
bonuses and discounts dependent upon the quantity of the premium programming sold by
the buying ﬁrm. Nevertheless, the possible deviation by the selling ﬁrm typically imposes
constraints on the outcome which can be implemented in equilibrium.
4. Incentives of the Upstream Rights’ Seller
We now consider the choice of the upstream rights’ seller between selling the rights exclu-
sively or nonexclusively for lump-sum fees, per-subscriber fees, or under a two-part tariﬀ.22
Armstrong (1999) considered the ﬁrst two of these alternatives in the absence of resale, and
concluded that the rights’ seller would prefer exclusive contracting when the programming
is sold for either lump-sum or per-subscriber fees. In this section we show that:
Proposition 4 With reselling for a ﬁxed payment, variable fee, or two-part tariﬀ with
non-negative ﬁxed component, selling exclusively for a ﬁxed payment is optimal for the
upstream monopolist.
4.1. Selling for lump-sum payments
The upstream rights’ seller could sell the rights for a lump-sum payment either exclusively
to one ﬁrm or nonexclusively to both ﬁrms. Under exclusive sale with reselling at variable
fee allowed, the downstream ﬁrm which acquires the rights ends up reselling to the rival
for a per-subscriber fee of q = α.E i t h e r ﬁrm is willing to pay α for the exclusive rights,
so the upstream rights’ seller obtains the same payment of α for the rights under either a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer or an ascending-bid auction.23
If the rights are sold nonexclusively for a lump-sum fee, the beneﬁtt oe i t h e rﬁrm from
acquiring the nonexclusive rights is zero, given that the rival ﬁrm also obtains the rights.
The upstream seller’s promise not to also sell to the other ﬁrm is not credible under non-
exclusive sale. Once a ﬁrm i has purchased, the seller will want to also sell to j for a
payment up to lj,w h i c hj would accept. Given this, each ﬁrm i will not pay more than li.







In conclusion, the upstream rights’ seller prefers to sell the rights exclusively rather
than non-exclusively. Note that when the rights are sold nonexclusively δΠ = −(li + lj)
and δV = δW = α, whereas under exclusive selling δΠ = δV =0and δW = α.T h e
downstream ﬁrms prefer exclusive selling, while consumers prefer nonexclusive selling.
22While in this environment with externalities other mechanisms could possibly result in higher revenue
for the upstream seller, we focus on a comparison between these simple and commonly used mechanisms.
23Under e x c l u s i v es a l ew i t hr e s e l l i n ga tﬁxed fee, ﬁrm A will outbid ﬁrm B for the rights and pay lA+bA
under a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer or lB +m a xhlA,b Bi in an ascending-bid auction with no reserve price.
Since lA + bA can exceed α when the intial asymmetry between the ﬁrms is large enough, i.e. when the
industry leader’s initial market share exceeds 75%, the upstream rights seller might wish to sell the rights
exclusively but prohibit resale. We assume that this case does not apply. Note that this can only occur if
the upstream rights seller can commit itself to a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, as lB +m a xhlA,b Bi < α always.
164.2. Selling for per-subscriber fees
Suppose next that the upstream rights’ seller makes the premium programming available
to the downstream ﬁrms for a per-subscriber fee rather than for a ﬁxed payment. If the
rights are sold exclusively to one ﬁrm for a per-subscriber fee of ri when ﬁrm i acquires
the rights and resells to ﬁrm j at a price of q, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are
πi = πi(si,s j)+q − ri
πj = πj(sj,s i).
The reselling ﬁrm sets q = α regardless of ri.I fri ≤ α then resale will take place and the
rights’ seller will receive RS = ri for the rights. Hence ri = α is optimal for the rights’
seller, and both ﬁrms will be willing to pay up to this price.24,25
If the rights are sold nonexclusively for a per-subscriber fee, both ﬁrms will purchase
the premium programming if and only if ri ≤ α. In a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer the upstream
rights’ seller will set rA = rB = α and earn revenues of RS = α. When selling for per-
subscriber fees, exclusive or non-exclusive selling yield the same revenue to the upstream
rights’ seller.
4.3. Selling for two-part tariﬀs
We now consider what happens when the programming rights are ﬁrst sold for two-part
tariﬀ hri,R ii and then resold for two-part tariﬀs hqi,Q ii.
Lemma 2 With reselling for two-part tariﬀsw i t hﬁxed components QA and QB,t h e
upstream seller obtains α + QA + QB when selling exclusively for a ﬁxed payment and α
when selling non-exclusively.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Selling rights exclusively for a lump-sum fee weakly dominates other selling schemes for
the rights’ seller. Under exclusive selling for a lump-sum fee the rights’ seller will obtain
α for the rights when they are resold for a per-subscriber fee, whether or not it is able
24Reselling will always occur since we may deﬁne α0





6 . Since this is satisﬁed for α by assumption (3.1), it is also true for α0
i.
25Armstrong (1999) notes that in the absence of resale the willingness of each downstream ﬁrm to pay
for the rights will depend upon the terms oﬀered to its competitor should it reject any given oﬀer from the
rights seller. If the upstream seller can commit itself to making a favourable oﬀer to the rival ﬁrm in the
event of a rejection, it can extract a high payment from either ﬁrm by exploiting the negative externality
suﬀered when the rival acquires the rights for a low per-subscriber charge. Hence, the sale of rights for
per subscriber fees in the absence of resale raises some diﬃcult issues of credibility which are not easily
resolved, at least when the seller has the ability to make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Armstrong argues that
under credible selling procedures the upstream seller will obtain at most α for the rights. This would also
be the outcome when the seller holds an auction with no reserve price. When the rights can instead be
resold for a per-subscriber fee, the value of the rights to either ﬁrm is independent of the oﬀer made to its
competitor, and simply equal to α. Thus resale for per-subscriber fees allows us to sidestep the credibility
issue.
17to commit itself to making a take it or leave it oﬀer to downstream ﬁrms. Selling rights
for per-subscriber fees also earns revenues of α for the upstream rights’ seller. The rights’
seller obtains up to R = RS = α + lj + li when rights are sold exclusively for a lump-sum
fee and resold under a two-part tariﬀ.
As remarked above, when the selling ﬁrm does not have all the bargaining power,
the ﬁxed component Qi of the two-part tariﬀ in the reselling contract can be negative.
In this case, reselling under simple two-part tariﬀs may end up reducing the upstream
rights’ seller’s proﬁts, since the willingness to pay of each ﬁrm would then be ΓA = ΓB =
α + QA + QB < α.26 Note that in this case, it might be better for the upstream seller to
forbid ﬁxed components in the reselling contracts, or alternatively to sell non-exclusively
at α.
5. Remedies
The Oﬃce of Fair Trading already informally regulates BSkyB’s resale prices and it has
intervened in the pay-TV market on an number of occasions. During the most recent
auction for Premier League broadcasting rights in June 2000, for instance, the OFT inter-
vened to ensure that the rights were split into a package of pay per view rights and non
pay per view rights, with no company permitted to win the auctions for both packages.
It also (unsuccessfully) challenged the Premier League’s collective selling practices in the
Restrictive Trade Practices Court in 1999 (see Cave and Crandall (2001)). If the OFT’s
current Competition Act inquiry ﬁnds that BSkyB is engaging in anticompetitive conduct
designed to damage its competitors or exploit consumers, additional and more eﬀective
remedies will need to be found.
The key competition problem identiﬁed in our analysis is that resale contracts spec-
ifying per-subscriber fees allow the downstream ﬁrms which acquire the exclusive rights
to premium content to relaxes downstream price competition. Dissipation of monopoly
rents is avoided and consumers are deprived of the beneﬁts of competition. Exclusive
vertical contracts then permit upstream rights owners to transfer their monopoly power
downstream, resulting in higher prices and lower consumer welfare. Eﬀective remedies
should therefore focus on regulating the way in which rights are sold and resold.27 Below
we consider three such remedies: forced divestiture of premium programming rights or
forced rights splitting; forced rights sharing or reselling for lump-sum fees; and a ban on
exclusive vertical contracts.
26Note that this implies that if the ﬁrms could commit themselves ex ante to paying a negative ﬁxed
fee Q, they would end up paying less for the rights to the upstream seller, and each ﬁrm’s proﬁtw o u l d
increase by Q.
27We focus here on remedies designed to increase market competitiveness rather than regulate monopoly
behaviour. In our model a price-squeeze test amounts to a requirement that the reselling ﬁrm should earn
positive proﬁts on the bundle of basic and premium programming at price q, i.e. pi − ci − q>0. This
condition is always satisﬁed in equilibrium, however, so imposes no additional constraint upon resale
prices. An alternative might be to regulate the resale price q directly. As q is lowered from α, surplus is
transferred on a one for one basis from ﬁrms to consumers. Hence, not surprisingly, direct price regulation
is a more eﬀective, albeit more heavy-handed, regulatory measure than a price squeeze test.
185.1. Forced rights splitting or rights divestiture
As noted above, the OFT recently intervened in the pay-TV market to ensure that Premier
League broadcasting rights were split into a package of pay per view rights and a package
of non pay per view rights, with no pay-TV company permitted to win the auctions for
both packages. Cave and Crandall (2001) also suggest that the rationale behind the OFT’s
challenge of Premier League collective selling practices in the Restrictive Trade Practices
Court, was that the Premier League should make more rights packages available: “In his
argument before the Court, the Director General made it plain that he had no objection
p e rs et oc o l l e c t i v es a l eo fm a t c h e sb yt h eP r e m i e rL e a g u e .I n d e e dh es u g g e s t e dt h a tt w o
or more packages of rights could be sold to separate broadcasters, each granting exclusivity
over the matches in question.”
It is unclear, however, whether the splitting of broadcasting rights into separate exclu-
sive packages can be expected to have any signiﬁcant procompetitive eﬀect. To address
this issue we consider two alternative ways in which rights could be separated into pack-
ages. First, forced rights splitting prescribes that the rights’ seller is required to split the
rights and sell them to diﬀerent ﬁrms. Second, forced rights divestiture prescribes that
the downstream ﬁrm which has acquired the exclusive rights is asked to divest itself of a
fraction of the rights by selling them for a lump-sum fee to a competitor.
Forced rights splitting. Suppose ﬁrst that the upstream rights’ seller splits the rights
into two packages αA and αB such that αA + αB = α. Without loss of generality, assume
that ﬁrm A acquires the rights to αA and ﬁrm B acquires the rights to αA. Each will then
resell the rights for a per-subscriber charge of qi ≤ αi so that πi =( pi −ci −qj)xi +qi(1−
xi)=( pi − ci − qj − qi)xi + qi = πi(si,s j)+qi.T h eﬁrms will then agree on resale prices
qi = αi. The total surplus extracted from selling the premium programming is therefore
αA + αB = α.
How much will downstream ﬁrms be willing to pay for the split rights? Suppose that
the rights to αA are sold ﬁrst. In the second stage, each ﬁrm’s willingness to pay for
the rights to αB, given that the other ﬁrm has acquired the rights to αA, is then just
Γ
αB
i = αB. If this is the price paid for αB at the second stage under a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer, the willingness to pay for αA is then Γ
αA
i = αA. Hence, when the rights’ seller can
make take it or leave it oﬀers, we obtain




Forced rights splitting simply creates two downstream monopolies and does not diﬀer from
the case in which the exclusive rights are all sold to a single ﬁrm.28
28When the rights seller does not have all the bargaining power, and we impose the symmetric Nash
bargaining solution we ﬁnd that forced rights splitting still has no eﬀect on competition, consumer surplus
or total welfare, but may eﬀect how much the upstream rights seller receives for the rights.
19Forced rights divestiture. By forced rights divestiture we mean a requirement on the
ﬁrm which holds the exclusive rights to give up a fraction of them to its rival in exchange
for a ﬁxed payment. This could be implemented, for instance, by requiring ﬁrm i to divest
itself of αj to ﬁrm j, while retaining αi. It is natural to assume that αi ≥ αj and αi+αj = α.
Again, ﬁrms will resell the rights for per-subscriber fee qi = αi, so that the total surplus
extracted from selling the premium programming is αA +αB = α. The willingness to pay
to acquire the rights depends upon the transfer price for αj which we denote by zji.W h e n
ﬁrm i acquires the rights its net gain is αi + zjj and when it does not acquire them its
net gain is αj − zji. Hence Γi =( αi − αj)+zjj + zji. The maximum transfer either ﬁrm
would pay is αj and the maximum value of Γi is α. Under take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers the
same payoﬀs as under forced rights splitting result. In conclusion, forced rights divestiture
has again no eﬀect on competition, consumer surplus or welfare.29
5.2. Forced rights sharing
Resale of exclusive rights for per-subscriber fees results in both ﬁrms charging a price
increment of δPi = α for the premium good and consumers receiving no beneﬁtf r o mt h e
availability of the premium product. If instead the rights are acquired by both ﬁrms for
a lump-sum fee, each downstream ﬁrms’ price increment is δPi =0 . Hence downstream
ﬁr m sm a k en oa d d i t i o n a lp r o ﬁts from the premium good, and consumer surplus increases
by α. This suggests that a remedy for the monopolistic pricing of the premium product
would be to force ﬁrms to resell programming rights to each other for lump-sum fees.
Assume then that ﬁrm A has acquired the exclusive rights and is forced to sell to ﬁrm B
for a lump-sum fee. Firm B will accept any transfer price zB less than lB. Similarly, if ﬁrm
B acquires the rights, A will accept any transfer price zA less than lA. If the regulatory
authority knows lA and lB, then it can impose transfer prices zA and zB satisfying these
restrictions (zi ≤ li) upon the ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm’s maximum willingness to pay for the
rights is then Γi(zi,z j) where Γi = zi + zj. To see this, suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h es e l l e rc a n
m a k eat a k ei to rl e a v ei to ﬀer to either ﬁrm. Table 1 represents a game in which ﬁrms
simultaneously decide to accept or reject a given oﬀer R from the seller. Either ﬁrm will
accept any oﬀer R ≤ zA+zB assuming that the other ﬁrm will acquire the rights if it does
not. Firm i will reject the seller’s oﬀer, on the other hand, if R>z j and it assumes that
ﬁrm j will also reject the oﬀer. For max(zA,z B) <R≤ zA + zB there are therefore two
pure strategy equilibria, hAccept,Accepti and hReject,Rejecti.I f R<max(zA,z B) then
hAccept,Accepti is the unique dominant strategy equilibrium.
Table 1
Firm B accepts Firm B rejects
Firm A accepts πA + 1
2 [zB − R − zA], πB + 1
2 [zA − R − zB] πA + zB − R, πB − zB
Firm A rejects πA − zA, πB + zA − R πA, πB
29Allowing for bargaining between the downstream ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta ﬀect this result.
20Alternatively, if the seller holds an ascending bid auction with no reserve price, either
ﬁr mw i l lb i du pt ozB + zA before dropping out. To see this note that ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ is πi
−zi when dropping out and it is πi+zj −R when wining the auction at price R.F i r mi is
t h e r e f o r ew i l l i n gt os t a yi ns ol o n ga sR ≤ zi +zj. The result of an ascending-bid auction
with no reserve price is:
δΠ = −(zA + zB)
RS =( zA + zB)
δV = α
δW = α
So long as the regulatory authority can implement resale prices zi ≤ li,t h i sr e m e d y
transfers α to consumers and allows the upstream rights’ seller to obtain revenues equal
to the sum of those resale prices.30
5.3. Regulatory rights-sharing rule
The regulators are unlikely to know the values of lA and lB, and so could base a rights
sharing formula on observable market variables. For instance, each ﬁrm could be asked to
pay a fraction of the cost of the rights in proportion to its market shares. If ﬁrm i has
paid Ri to acquire the exclusive rights from the upstream rights’ seller, ﬁrm j would pay
a lump-sum of xjRi to acquire the rights from ﬁrm i.T h e n
ΓA(RA,R B)=RAxB(sA,s B)+RBxA(sA,s B)
ΓB(RA,R B)=RAxB(sA,s B)+RBxA(sA,s B),
with RAxB(sA,s B) ≤ lB and RBxA(sA,s B) ≤ lA, which implies that RA = RB = R,
so the value of the rights are equalized. It is easy to see that the maximum value of R
consistent with incentive compatibility is lB/xB(sA,s B).
If the upstream rights’ seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of R , then assuming that
ﬁrm i will accept, ﬁrm j can do no better than to accept. hAccept,Accepti is an equilibrium
in weakly dominated strategies and results in zero revenue for the seller. hReject,Rejecti
is a more reasonable equilibrium (see Table 2).
Table 2
Firm B accepts Firm B rejects
Firm A accepts πA − RxA, πB − RxB πA − RxA, πB − RxB
Firm A rejects πA − RxA, πB − RxB πA, πB
Consider an ascending bid auction for the rights. When will A or B drop out? Suppose
the current bid is R and it is B’s turn to either improve on R or drop out immediately. If
30The regulatory authority could simply impose zi =0 ,i= A,B to guarantee incentive compatibility,
but in this case the upstream rights seller would obtain no revenues for the rights.
21B drops out then his payoﬀ will be πB(sA,s B) −RxB(sA,s B),s ol o n ga sRxB ≤ lB.I fB
stays in his payoﬀ is at most πB(sA,s B)+ RxA(sA,s B) − R = πB(sA,s B) −RxB(sA,s B).
Hence B’s payoﬀ from dropping out immediately always (weakly) exceeds the payoﬀ from
staying in.31 It is therefore a (weakly) dominant strategy for B to drop out at R =0(i.e.
not to enter the auction). Likewise it is optimal for A not to enter the auction, so the
seller again obtains nothing for the rights.
A rights sharing formula based on the market share results in neither ﬁrm bidding a
price above zero for the rights and so probably cannot be used without modiﬁcation. One
solution is to interpret this remedy as an interim measure to be applied to rights held by
downstream ﬁrms, while existing vertical contracts with upstream rights’ sellers remain
in place. As such contracts expire, remedies could then be imposed upon the form of
future vertical contacts, as described below. An alternative would be to adapt the rule to
make the transfer prices proportionate to (e.g. historic) market shares, plus a regulatory
mark-up. Any mark-up larger than the bid increment in an ascending-bid auction would
mean that it is no longer a dominant strategy to drop out of the auction immediately.
5.4. Nonexclusive rights selling
The ﬁnal alternative we consider is to force the upstream rights’ seller to sell the rights
nonexclusively for lump-sum fees. When the rights are sold to both ﬁrms, ﬁrm i is willing
t op u r c h a s et h er i g h t ss ol o n ga st h ep r i c ed o e sn o te x c e e dli. The maximum the seller can
get under take it or leave it oﬀers is lA + lB,s ot h a t
δΠ = −(lB + lA)
RS =( lB + lA)
δV = α
δW = α.
From the seller’s point of view a rule which enforces nonexclusive selling upstream for
lump-sum fees may be preferable to a rule which imposes downstream reselling for lump-
sum fees under a regulatory market-share rule.32
6. Relation to the Licensing Literature
The conclusions derived in the speciﬁc model adopted in this paper are not entirely novel.
Similar results have been shown in the literature on patent licensing of an innovation
which reduces the marginal cost of production. While in most of the licensing literature
31B’s payoﬀ from dropping out is strictly higher for any postive bid increment.
32Following the Premier League’s auctions in June 2000, the cable company ntl returned the exclusive
pay-per-view rights, which it had won for a bid of £328 million. The Premier League has subsequently
resold these rights nonexclusively to each downstream pay-TV company for a single ﬁxed payment. The
total paid for the rights is not known, but it widely perceived to be much less than NTL’s original bid for
the exclusive rights.
22the patent holder is an outsider to the industry (cf. Kamien’s (1992) survey), Katz and
Shapiro (1985) consider the case of licensing to a competitor. They focus mostly on
licensing for a ﬁxed fee, but also brieﬂy discuss licensing for a per-unit charge (or royalty)
and a two-part tariﬀ. Licensor and licensee then compete à la Cournot in a homogeneous
product market.
Licensing for a ﬁxed fee to a rival is not always in the interest of the licensor, for the
same reason that reselling for a lump-sum fee is not always optimal in the basic Hotelling
model.33 Katz and Shapiro (1985) also consider variable-fee licensing contracts and ﬁnd
that there is always a licensing agreement which is preferred by both ﬁrms to no licensing.
Under Cournot competition, the licensor can always choose a royalty rate such that the
reaction function of the licensee is identical to the one without licensing. This licensing
agreement does not change the pattern of industry output, but results in cost savings
which are then appropriated by the licensing ﬁrm via the royalty rate and possibly a ﬁxed
fee.
The crucial diﬀerence with licensing is that in our model the buying ﬁrm does not
need to pay the per-subscriber fee if it induces its customers not to purchase the premium
programming. When distributing a competitor’s premium programming the buying ﬁrm
can reduce the demand for this good from its customers by making it relatively more
expensive. This possible ex-post deviation imposes a limit on how high the per-subscriber
fee can be. A licensee of a cost-reducing innovation must instead pay the agreed royalty on
the output in any case, without the option of avoiding the payment by not incorporating
the innovation. The only constraint on the level of the royalty is the licensee’s ex-ante
willingness to accept the licence agreement.
Shapiro (1985) explains that, more generally, ﬁrms can use licensing agreements to
facilitate collusion. Essentially, the licensor can induce the rival to reduce its output to
zero by imposing a high enough per unit royalty rate. The ﬁxed fee can then be used as
a “bribe” to induce the licensee to accept the output reduction, thus implementing the
collusive market outcome.34
When the ﬁxed component of the fee is restricted to being non-negative in the Cournot
model of Katz and Shapiro, the per-subscriber fee induces the ﬁrms to produce exactly
the same output as was produced in the absence of the licensing (resale) agreement,t h u s
e n a b l i n gt h e mt os h a r es o m eo ft h eb e n e ﬁts of the cost reducing innovation with con-
sumers.35 A payment from the licensor to the licensee is then required to compensate the
33In particular, large innovations which result in monopolization will not be licensed by either ﬁrm.
Small innovations will not be licensed by the industry leader but may be licensed by the smaller rival ﬁrm.
In both these cases, the industry leader outbids the rival in an auction to acquire the innovation, because
it has higher preemption incentives. These conclusions thus parallel exactly the conclusions reached in
the Hotelling model of this paper.
34Shapiro (1985) points out that even a “sham” innovation can be used to implement the collusive
market outcome by choosing a royalty rate and a negative ﬁxed fee, and notes that, “such a side payment,
in exchange for which the licensee would reduce its output, is likely to be illegal under the antitrust laws,
and for a good reason!”
35In the Cournot model with licensing at variable fee, the licensor faces a lower eﬀective cost than the
licensee. As a result, the licensor’s output increases by more than the reduction in the licensee’s output,
23rival for reducing its output further and increasing market price to the collusive level. If
negative transfers are not allowed, the consumers are not harmed by licensing.
In our Hotelling model instead, the per-subscriber resale fee shifts the reaction functions
of both ﬁrms outwards in exactly the same way, inducing both ﬁrms to increase their
retail prices. The resale contract results in both ﬁrms producing the same outputs as in
the absence of the premium programming (or innovation), while the retail prices increase
by an amount equal to the consumers’ willingness to pay for it. Per-subscriber resale
fees therefore extract all the rents from the availability of premium programming, and
consumers would be better oﬀ in the absence of resale contracts.
7. Conclusion
Our analysis implies that premium programming rights will be sold originally under exclu-
sive contracts for a lump-sum payment, and then resold for per-subscriber fees. Resale of
premium programming for per-subscriber fees relaxes downstream price competition and
provides incentives for both downstream ﬁrms to increase their prices. The proﬁts created
are initially captured by the reselling ﬁrm, and then transferred upstream to the rights
monopolist. The model thus predicts a number of the key features of competition in the
UK pay-TV market, and in particular the form of the rights selling and resale contracts.
Both the licensing literature and our analysis stress the anticompetitive eﬀects which
may arise from licensing or resale contracts which specify per-subscriber charges. Such
contracts dampen downstream price competition and allow the reselling ﬁrm to avoid the
rent dissipating eﬀects that licensing for a ﬁxed fee would induce. Monopoly power is thus
extended downstream and consumers may receive little or no beneﬁt from the innovation
or premium programming.36 In our setting, consumers are in the aggregate better oﬀ in
the absence of reselling, even if some are deprived of premium programming.
In the version of the Hotelling model adopted in this paper, rights splitting and forced
r i g h t sd i v e s t i t u r eh a v en oe ﬀect on prices, total proﬁts or welfare. Forced rights reselling
for lump-sum fees (or under a market share based formula) reallocates the gains from the
premium programming to consumers, as does nonexclusive sale of rights for lump-sum
fees. Remedies which alter the way in which rights are sold or resold can aﬀect both
competition and consumer welfare by transferring surplus from producers to consumers.
In more realistic versions of the model they would also increase social welfare.37
so that the total equilibrium quantity increases and the market price decreases.
36As Shapiro (2001) writes in his recent survey paper: “The traditional concern with cross-licenses
among competitors is that running royalties will be used as a device to elevate prices and eﬀectuate a
cartel.... Clearly, such concerns do not apply to licenses that involve small or no running royalties, but
rather have ﬁxed up-front payments.”
37A companion paper formulates a model of competitive price discrimination with both horizontal and
vertical diﬀerentiation in the tastes of consumers and the products oﬀered by the ﬁrms, along the lines of
Gilbert and Matutes (1993) and Rochet and Stole (2001).
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26Appendix A: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . If ﬁrm A acquires the rights, it will only resell to ﬁrm B for
a payment of at least bA, ﬁrm A’s beneﬁt from retaining the rights exclusively. Firm B’s
maximum willingness to pay is lB, ﬁrm B’s loss from not having access to the rights given
that ﬁrm A does. Since bA >l B, A never resells to B.
When ﬁrm B acquires the rights, reselling for a ﬁxed fee is mutually advantageous when
it results in an increase in asymmetry and total proﬁts compared to no reselling. When B
resells to A for a lump-sum fee, B’s loss is bA and A’s gain is lA. Reselling therefore occurs
if and only if lA ≥ bB which requires that 2(sA − sB) ≥ α so that the asymmetry after
reselling sA −sB is greater than before reselling |sA − sB − α|.I f2(sA −sB) ≤ α reselling
by ﬁrm B does not take place because it results instead in a decrease in asymmetry.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Consider any putative equilibrium in which ﬁrm i resells to ﬁrm
j for a per-subscriber charge of q>α. It is not required that the equilibrium be in the
competitive regime.38 In any such equilibrium, ﬁrm j’s proﬁts are πj =( pj − cj − q)xj
while ﬁrm j’s marginal consumer receives a net utility of uj + α − pj − txj. Now consider
ad e v i a t i o nb yﬁrm j in which it oﬀers to sell the basic product alone for a price equal to
pj − α and the premium product for a price of pj + ε. Firm j’s marginal consumer now
receives a net utility of uj −(pj −α)−txj from the basic product, and uj +α−pj −ε−txj
from the premium product. Hence, all of ﬁrm j’s customers will switch to consuming the
basic product alone, yielding ﬁrm j proﬁts (pj − α − cj)xj > (pj − cj − q)xj for q>α.
Firm j has a proﬁtable deviation.
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Denote the ﬁrms’ second stage equilibrium proﬁts under independent resale pricing for
a per-subscriber fee of q as π
q
i (si,s j)=πi (si,s j)+q and π
q
j (sj,s i)=πj (sj,s i) given in
38Analysis of the Hotelling model is complicated by the existence of a kinked demand curve at the point
where the marginal consumer is indiﬀerent between consuming and not consuming. Typically this issue is
avoided by making appropriate assumptions on parameters (see e.g. Laﬀont, Rey and Tirole (1998) and
Gilbert and Matutes (1993)). We cannot do so here because the reselling ﬁrm may wish to set q so as to
implement an equilibrium at the kink. According to this lemma however this cannot occur.
27(2.3). Similarly, the market shares are x
q
i = xi (si,s j) and x
q
j = xj (sj,s i), as given in (2.2).
Compared to the independent resale pricing scheme, the market share of the selling ﬁrm is








j for all µ ∈ [0,1] under
the competitive regime condition 3t>α + si − sj. The buying ﬁrm’s proﬁts are higher
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The right hand side of (A.2) is increasing in t, and so if it is satisﬁed for 3t = si − sj,i t









i for all values of t such that 3t>s i − sj.
It follows that when reselling, the superior ﬁrm A would always do better by using
proportional rather than independent variable resale price. For a given value of the resale
price q at which ﬁrm B purchases, the equilibrium proﬁts of both ﬁrms are higher under

























Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the resale subgame downstream when the rights are
purchased originally under a two-part tariﬀ.A ss e e na b o v e ,o n c eﬁrm i has acquired the
exclusive rights for a lump-sum fee of Ri (i.e. ri =0 ), it resells to ﬁrm j for a tariﬀ
hq,Qi = hα,l ji under a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Firm i’s willingness to pay for the rights
is Γi = α + li + lj.O n c e ﬁrm i has acquired the exclusive rights under a two-part tariﬀ
hri,R ii and resells them for hq,Qi,p r o ﬁts are
πi = πi(si,s j)+( q − ri)+( Q − Ri)
πj = πj(sj,s i) − Q.
Firm i makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to ﬁrm j for hq = α,Q= lj(ri)i,w h e r elj(ri)=
πj(sj,s i) − πj(sj,s i + α − ri) is the loss suﬀered by j when it does not acquire the rights
given that i acquires them for a per-subscriber fee of ri.T h et w oﬁrms’ payoﬀsc a nt h e n
be written as
πi = πi(si,s j)+( α − ri)+lj(ri) − Ri
πj = πj(sj,s i) − lj(ri).
For given variable fees ri,r j oﬀered by the upstream rights’ seller, ﬁrm i is willing to pay
a ﬁxed fee of Ri ≤ (α − ri)+lj(ri)+li(rj) for the exclusive rights. If ri = rj = α then
the maximum Ri = lj(α)+li(α)=0and the upstream seller can obtain at most α for the
rights. If ri = rj =0 , the upstream seller can obtain up to RS = α + lj + li.
When the upstream rights’ seller chooses to sell the rights exclusively to one down-
stream ﬁrm, ﬁrm i is willing to pay up to ri ≤ α and Ri =( α−ri)+lj(ri)+li(rj) for the
rights, which depends upon the per-subscriber price oﬀered to ﬁrm j. For any value of rj
28ﬁrm i’s willingness to pay is maximized by setting ri =0 . Similarly, for any value of ri
ﬁrm i’s willingness to pay is maximized by setting rj =0 . Hence setting ri = rj =0and
Ri = Rj = α + lA + lB is optimal for the rights’ seller. Since the value of the rights is the
same to both ﬁrms, the upstream seller obtains α + lA + lB with either take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers or in an ascending-bid auction.
When the rights are sold nonexclusively we assume that the upstream seller oﬀers tariﬀs
hri,R ii to the two downstream ﬁrms i = A,B.I fﬁrm i purchases then ﬁrm j is willing
to pay rj ≤ α and Rj = bj(rj,r i)+lj(ri) to purchase the rights from the upstream seller,
where bj(rj,r i)=πj(sj+α−rj,s i+α−ri)−πj(sj,s i) and lj(ri) is as deﬁned above, so that
bj(rj,r i)+lj(ri)=πj(sj+α−rj,s i+α−ri)−πj(sj,s i+α−ri). We now show that setting
ri = rj = α and Ri = Rj =0thereby obtaining RS = α is the rights’ seller’s optimal policy
under nonexclusive sale. Note that R
j
S = rj+πj(sj+α−rj,s i+α−ri)−πj(sj,s i+α−ri) is
increasing in rj,s ot h a trj = α. Similarly, Ri
S is increasing in ri,s ot h a tri = α. Hence
ri = rj = α maximizes the seller’s proﬁts. Given this, we must have Ri = Rj =0 .
Exclusive upstream sale for a ﬁxed fee of α + lj + li is optimal for the rights’ seller when
resale occurs under take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers.
29